We investigate the impact of the economic fundamentals, sovereign credit ratings, political uncertainty, and the ECB's Securities Markets Program (SMP) on Greek sovereign spreads. Our findings show that sovereign downgrades and political uncertainty appear to have been drivers of the sharp rises in Greek sovereign spreads from 2008-9 onwards, over-and-above the impact of the economic fundamentals. Our findings also show that prior to 2008-2009, the markets failed to incorporate Greece's deteriorating fundamentals into the price of Greek sovereigns. We demonstrate that, once markets reassessed their pricing of Greek credit risk, the change in the influence of the fundamentals came swiftly and abruptly, exhibiting overshooting characteristics. The SMP reduced spreads while it was in operation.
Introduction
The unfolding of the Greek sovereign debt crisis beginning in late 2009 --and the euro-area crisis more generally --has called into question the extent to which the price of sovereign risk, as reflected in the interest rate spread on sovereigns, can be explained by macroeconomic fundamentals. In the run-up to Greece's entry into the euro area in 2001, the 2-year spread between Greek and German sovereigns fell precipitously, from about 500 basis points in the late 1990s to about 40 basis points at the time when Greece became a member of the single-currency area on January 1, 2001; during that period, the spread on 10-year sovereigns fell from about 600 basis points to about 50 basis points.
Over the following years, both the 2-year and 10-year spreads stabilized within a fairly narrow range of 10 to 50 basis points until the end of 2008, despite Greece's large and growing fiscal and external deficits (as we explain below). Then, in October of 2009, a newly-elected Greek government stunned the markets with news that the fiscal deficit for 2009 would likely turn out to be more than twice the outgoing government's projection of 6 per cent of GDP 1 .
That news set-off a relentless upward rise of spreads and a succession of ratings' downgrades of Greek sovereigns and Greek banks (which held large portfolios of sovereigns), resulting in what appeared to be self-reinforcing feedback loops between ratings and spreads. The increases in spreads contributed to a sharp contraction of real output, which had a negative impact on the debt-dynamics, a process which itself contributed to rating downgrades, further rises in spreads, and, ultimately, an increase in political uncertainty. related to contagion --or, more generally, market psychology --accounted for the unexplained portions of spreads. An earlier study by the present authors followed that approach (see Gibson, Hall and Tavlas, 2012) . In that study, we examined the macroeconomic determinants of spreads between the 10-year benchmark Greek government bond and the German 10-year sovereign. Our data sample was monthly and covered the period from January 2000 through September 2010. Thus, our data covered the pre-crisis period (i.e., the period prior to the fall of 2009) and the early part of the crisis period. Our results suggested that spreads were significantly below the levels that would have been predicted on the basis of the fundamentals during the mid-2000s, but significantly above what had been predicted by the fundamentals for much of 2010.
As in our previous study, in this paper we focus on the determinants of Greek sovereign spreads. However, in light of the intensification of the Greek financial crisis after the fall of 2010 (the end-point of our earlier sample period), here we extend the sample period through the first quarter of 2012 3 . Moreover, in addition to examining the determinants of 10-year spreads, we examine the determinants of 2-year spreads. In early-2011, 2-year spreads began to rise far above 10-year spreads, leading (as noted above) to an inverted yield curve. By examining the determinants of the 2-year spread,
we are able to focus on the short-term risk (or volatility) that predominated in the markets.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the existing literature on spreads during the euro-area financial crisis in several ways. First, in addition to investigating the credit ratings. The impact of credit downgrades on debt sustainability appears to have been pronounced in the case of Greece since the country began the crisis with a very high debt-to-GDP ratio. Consequently, credit downgrades and the ensuing rises in spreads had the potential to set-off unstable debt-dynamics, leading to the need of debt restructuring, a potential that was, in fact, realized. In other words, debt dynamics in Greece were especially sensitive to credit downgrades and changes in spreads.
Second, we examine the extent to which the determinants of spreads changed over time. In this connection, we use the Kalman filter to estimate the underlying time-varying coefficients of those determinants. By doing so, we are able to measure both the speed with which the impact of the determinants of spreads changed, and the timing of the changes that took place in the coefficients. To preview of our results, we find that for a number of years after Greece's entry into the euro area, markets appeared to effectively discount the economic fundamentals in pricing Greek sovereign credit risk. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and especially with the unexpected news about Greece's fiscal situation in the fall of 2009, the markets went through a process of learning as they increasingly priced credit (and, perhaps, currency) risk into
Greek spreads, at times overpricing risk, thereby contributing to the self-reinforcing character of the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the recent literature on the macroeconomic determinants of spreads in the euro area. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents our methodology and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
The recent macro-international finance literature has focused on two presumably separate measures of sovereign risk --(1) spreads on government bond yields, and (2) CDS spreads. An inference that can be drawn from the results of the above studies is that markets understated --or even overlooked --the role of some of the macroeconomic fundamentals in the determination of sovereign risk in the years leading up to the global financial crisis.
In what follows, we investigate the reasons for this market behavior with respect to spreads on Greek sovereigns. In particular, we examine the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and Greek spreads, whether the fundamentals were important determinants of spreads prior to the outbreak of the Greek sovereign crisis, and, if not, whether and when they became significant determinants of spreads. In investigating the role of fundamentals, we control for potential independent influences stemming from political stability and ratings downgrades.
Data and stylized facts
Typically, studies that deal with the macroeconomic determinants of sovereign risk focus on fundamentals that capture fiscal sustainability and external sustainability and/or competitiveness. Measures of fiscal sustainability include the fiscal balance and public debt. Measures of external sustainability and/or competitiveness include the current account balance, external debt, relative prices, trade openness and real growth (an important determinant of the sustainability of a country's external obligations). Where appropriate, variables are specified as ratios to GDP. Note that the foregoing variables tend to be interrelated. For example, an expanding fiscal deficit is often accompanied by an expanding external deficit and growing external debt, while a deterioration in competitiveness, as defined by movements in relative prices, tends to be accompanied by growing external and fiscal imbalances. In addition to variables representing macroeconomic fundamentals, in our previous study (Gibson, Hall and Tavlas, 2012) we introduced a fiscal "news" variable in our specification of the determinants of Greek bond spreads on the supposition that unexpected (positive or negative) news --especially a series of unexpected developments --about fiscal fundamentals can drive market dynamics, particularly in the short term. We found that the accumulation of fiscal news had a significant impact on Greek sovereign spreads, a finding corroborated in a different context (both in terms of the definition of a news variable and in terms of countries considered) by Beetsma, Giuliodori, de Jong and Widijanto (2013).
We now turn to a description of the variables used in this study. Our sample period runs from January 2000 to March 2012; the data frequency is monthly. The inversion of the yield curve became more pronounced, reflecting increased market expectations of a debt restructuring.
To capture the effects of the fundamentals (economic and political) on spreads, we use the following variables. We include three measures of the fiscal situation.
(
1)
The ratio of government debt to GDP. The upper part of Figure In addition to fundamentals dealing with the fiscal and external situations, we use the following variables.
(1) Real GDP growth. High real growth helps improve debt sustainability; therefore, all other factors held equal, we expect higher growth to reduce spreads. 
Empirical results
We begin by testing for cointegration among the above variables for both the 10-year and the 2-year spread, assuming that the SMP dummy is exogenous. The results are reported in Table 1 for the 10-year spread and Table 2 for the 2-year spread. For the 10-year spread there is strong evidence of up to six cointegrating vectors. As shown in Table   2 for the 2-year spread, there is evidence of at least five --and possibly six (using the trace statistic) --cointegrating relationships. Again, the hypothesis that spreads are exogenous is rejected. An implication of these results is that we can treat spreads as endogenous. We now proceed to an investigation of their determinants.
We begin with a simple static regression, which we interpret as the long-run determination of spreads. Given our above intuitive account of the evolution of the fundamentals and spreads, we do not expect this relationship to necessarily exhibit stable parameters and we are not especially concerned with the economic interpretation of each of the fundamentals. Our objective here is simply to use the basic specification as a point of departure for a time-varying analysis.
The results for the 10-year and 2-year spreads are reported in Tables 3 and 4 greater role in the evolution of the 2-year spread than the 10-year spread.
As we indicated above, it may have been the case that rating agencies formulated their ratings of Greek sovereigns on the basis of both present and projected fundamentals.
In that case, the residuals from a ratings regression involving both present and projected fundamentals would have been smaller than a regression based only on present fundamentals, and the impact of these residuals on spreads would (likely) have been smaller as well. Thus, to the extent that ratings were made on the basis of both present and projected fundamentals, our conjecture that ratings downgrades led to selfperpetuating rises in spreads needs to be tempered. Nevertheless, there are also several reasons to suppose that our empirical methodology does not fully capture the selfreinforcing impact of downgrades. First, we focused on the effects of sovereign 
Equations (1)- (6) Finally, the residuals from the ratings equations show a sharp increase from early 2011, reflecting the large number of downgrades that occurred along with the fact that they
were multiple notch downgrades -in early 2011 Greece was BB+; by the end of the sample, she had been downgraded to Selective Default.
In the case of 2-year spreads (Figure 8) , the coefficients are more unstable than they are for the 10-year spreads. The current account actually has the correct sign (negative) until the latter part of the sample; the same pertains to the fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, as in the case of the 10-year spread, the coefficients on the fundamentals are again close to zero until 2008-9. There is again evidence that the markets slowly woke up to the fundamentals after the surprise news about Greece's fiscal situation in late 2009.
Conclusions
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, the time-varying results indicate that the coefficients on most, if not all, of the variables were near zero until 2008-9. In other words, prior to 2008-9, financial markets paid little attention to the deteriorating Greek economic fundamentals in pricing spreads. Effectively, the markets treated Greek sovereigns almost on a par with German sovereigns. Thus, the markets failed to incorporate credit risk in the price of Greek sovereigns, presumably because the markets expected that Greek sovereigns would be protected by the core euro-area countries should the need arise. Second, sovereign downgrades and political uncertainly appear to have been drivers of the sharp rises in Greek sovereign spreads from 2008-9 onwards, over-and-above the impact of the economic fundamentals. An implication of our finding of a separate effect on spreads from the credit downgrades is the following; negative feedback loops between spreads, real economic activity, debt sustainability and credit ratings, perpetuating and deepening the financial crisis. Third, the Eurosystem's SMP programme had a pronounced effect on reducing spreads whilst the programme was in place. Fourth, our time-varying results provide support for the view that once markets reassessed their pricing of Greek credit risk, the change in the influence of the fundamentals came swiftly and abruptly, exhibiting overshooting characteristics, thus suggesting that market psychology played an independent role in the pricing of spreads.
These conclusions suggest that markets were not rational during the sample period considered in this paper. While the above evidence is consistent with the self-reinforcingfeedback-loop hypothesis, a fuller analysis would require that ratings and spreads be modeled as a simultaneous system. Such a system could be used to quantify the degree of overshooting of spreads from the fundamentals. We leave this idea as a suggestion for future research. 
